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Abstract 
Based on FTA of safety-system engineering and analysis of risk or hazard factors of technological process and materials, it is 
determined of the fault tree factor table of crude oil gathering-transport combination station and established of the fire and 
explosion fault tree. By means of Boolean algebra simplification, the minimum path sets of the system are achieved. Then the 
occurrence probability of the fault tree top event is given together with the three importance-degree analysis of the basic event. 
Through the fault tree analysis, the paper discusses qualitatively and quantitatively the main factors of fire and explosion in
combination station, and some corresponding improvement measures are proposed. The analysis result can provide theoretical 
direction for design, construction, management and maintenance of crude oil gathering-transport combination station. 
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Introduction:The oil combination station is a key link in the oil production. It mainly plays the role of receiving 
the oil from the oil transferring station, going on separation purification, heating of the oil gas and water, and 
transporting the qualified processed crude oil, purified sewage and purified natural gas down to the next oil depot. In 
the combination station, the system for oil-water separation is called gathering-transport system, which is an 
important process of crude oil production. It is directly related to the quality of crude oil product and wastewater 
reinjection. Also, it determines whether the production process can be in safe and smooth operation as well as the 
economic benefits of oil production. The crude oil gathering-transport combination station is a first-class vital part, 
in which there are crisscross oil and gas pipelines, densely-covered pressure vessels. The oil products are flammable 
and explosive in the production and storage process. Once an accident happens, it will inevitably cause significant 
personal injury and property losses. Therefore, fire and explosion prevention work is especially important in the 
crude oil gathering-transport combination station.  
1. Production Process of the Crude Oil Gathering-transport Combination Station and Risk Analysis of the 
Fire and Explosion 
1.1. Production Process and Its Risk Analysis of the Fire and Explosion
Production process of the crude oil gathering-transport combination station is as shown in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. process flow chart of the crude oil gathering-transport combination station
Risk analysis of the fire and explosion in the process units is as follows.  
• Oil and Gas Separation Area: It generally employs multi-stage separation. Its key technique is to control the 
pressure and liquid level of the separator. In the process, the most prone accident to happen is the separator’s oil 
leakage.
• Crude Oil Dehydration Area: It achieves oil-water separation by means of thermo-chemistry and electrochemistry. 
The fire and explosion risk is that system failure of the free water removal device causes the physical explosion, 
then resulting in vessel rupture. Corrosion failure of the export pipeline and fault failure of the subsidiary 
component both lead to the leakage accumulation of crude oil or natural gas. In addition, if there is a coil 
perforation in the dehydration heating furnace, it will lead to a sharp rise of the crude oil level, the pressure rise, 
and safety valve taking off. As a result, the oil and hot water are erupted, which will bring about fire and 
explosion once meeting with the fire source. 
• Storage Tank Area: A large amount of crude oil is stored in the storage tank, which mostly use the open type 
process at present. Its improper operation can easily result in roof fall and hold pressure, which has a higher fire 
and explosion risk. 
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• Wastewater Treatment Area: Wastewater sent from the crude oil dehydration station still contains a certain 
amount of oil and gas. Therefore, there are some fire and explosion hazards in the waste oil tank and recovery 
pool. 
• Crude Oil Outer Transportation Area: the major facilities include oil pump, container and pipelines, etc. Failure 
of the oil pump or mechanical air exhaust device is a major fire and explosion risk. 
1.2. Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis of the Production Medium  
The main working media are crude oil and natural gas in the crude oil gathering-transport combination station. 
They both belong to the grade B fire risk articles, and own such material characteristics as combustibility and 
explosiveness, easy evaporability, easy accumulation of static charges, easy flow diffusion and thermal expansion . 
Oxygen in the air is a combustion-supporting material for the fire and explosion. And the main ignition sources are 
open fire, electrostatic discharge, lightning stroke and stray current. 
2. Establishment of the Fire and Explosion Fault Tree in the Crude Oil Gathering-transport Combination 
Station
FTA (fault tree analysis for short), is a graphic deduction analysis. It starts from a possible accident (top event) 
and down from the top, seeks the direct and indirect cause event of the top event layer by layer. Then the logical 
relation between these events is expressed with the logic diagram. 
This paper takes an example of a crude oil gathering-transport combination station in Dingbian Oil Drilling and 
Production Company and takes a fire and explosion accident as the top event. By analyzing the fire and explosion 
risk of technological process and production medium, it is concluded that the main reasons for the fire and explosion 
in combination station are the open fire, electrostatic spark, lightning stroke, impact spark, electrical equipment fault 
and spontaneous combustion source.   
Factors of the fire and explosion fault tree are as shown in Table 1. 
 Table 1. Factors table of the fire and explosion fault tree in combination station 
T
Fire and 
explosion
accident
AR1 Ignition source AR2
Oil-gas flammable 
concentration reach AR3 Open fire 
AR4 Impact spark AR5 Lightning spark AR6 Electrical apparatus spark AR7
Spontaneous 
combustion source 
AR8
Electrostatic 
spark AR9 Fire work in tank area AR10 Other open fire AR11 Arrester failure 
AR12
Oil tank 
electrostatic 
discharge 
AR13
Human body electrostatic 
discharge AR14 Electrostatic accumulation AR15 Bad grounding 
AR16
Measuring 
operation error AR17
Oil-gas flammable 
concentration reach 
outside tank 
AR18
Oil-gas flammable 
concentration reach inside 
tank
AR19 Oil leakage 
$R Oil-gas leakage ;R Oil-gas explosive limit reach ;R Blind fire work ;R Left fires after fire work
;R
No explosion 
detection before 
fire work
;R Engine Exhaust of passing vehicles ;R Artificial open fire ;R Storage tank impact
;R Operation with iron nail shoes ;R Operation with iron tool ;R
Over-standard lightning-
prevention grounding 
resistance
;R Damaged lightning-protection facility
;R Design defect ;R Lightning stroke ;R No explosion proof of electrical equipment ;R
Damaged explosion-
proof electrical 
equipment
;R
Oil with no safe 
cool
temperature
;R Oil auto-ignition temperature reach ;R high oil flow velocity ;R
Rough inner wall of 
pipeline
;R Oil impact on metal container ;R
Friction of splashing oil 
and air ;R
Oil surface with technical 
floating debris ;R
Apparatus not up to 
standard
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;R Not enough standing time ;R
No setting of electrostatic 
grounding device ;R
Grounding resistance not 
up to standard ;R
Damaged grounding 
wire
;R
Human Contact 
with chemical 
fibber product 
;R Close to conductor in operation ;R Bad ventilation ;R
Flammable oil and gas 
existing in tank
;R Air mixing in tank ;R
Oil leakage caused by 
operational error ;R Breathing valve failure ;R Damaged valve
;R Not closed hole for oil measure XR37
Oil leakage caused by 
tank corrosion ;R Tank oil-overs ;R Oil-gas volatilization
;R Tank connection with the outside      
The fault tree totally includes 40 basic events: 1x ， 2x ， 3x …, 40x are codes of the basic events, T is the top event, 
and 1A , 2A …., 20A  are codes of the intermediate events. 
The fault tree diagram is as shown in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2. Fire and explosion fault tree in the crude oil gathering-transport combination station 
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3. Analysis the Fire and Explosion Fault Tree in the Crude Oil Gathering-transport Combination Station  
3.1. Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative analysis of the fault tree is to identify the logic relations among each basic event or their 
combinations with the top event, and then to obtain the minimal path sets, minimal cut sets of fault tree and the 
structure importance coefficient of each basic event. And thus preventive and control measures are taken more 
pertinently. 
There are far more OR gates than AND gates in the fault tree. In order to simplify the analysis process, the fault 
tree can be converted into the corresponding success tree. Then the success tree can be simplified by using Boolean 
algebra and the minimal path sets are obtained: 
{ }11P x=
{ }282423222120191817161514121110987654322 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }292423222120191817161514121110987654323 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx= { }2827262517161514121110987654,324 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }2927262517161514121110987654,325 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }28242322212019181716151413987654326 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }29242322212019181716151413987654327 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx= { }282726251716151413987654,328 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }292726251716151413987654,329 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=
{ }4039383736353433313010 ,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxx= ˗
{ }4039383736353433323011 ,,,,,,,,,P xxxxxxxxxx= .
The minimal path sets represents the system safety. According to the above simplification results, there are total 
11 groups of minimal path sets, which mean that 11 possible ways can help to prevent the fire and explosion 
accident in combination station. The most economical and effective scheme is chosen to control accident based on 
such conditions as the structure importance degree of the basic event in the minimal path sets, difficult degree of 
technical realization and amount of invested capital, etc.  
Structure importance degree of each basic event is calculated in the following section: 
Structure importance degree analysis is discussing the importance degree of each basic event from structure of 
the fault tree. Put it in another way, it’s analyzing the influence degree of each basic event on the top event. The 
larger the structure importance of basic event is, the greater its impact upon the top event will be. 
Structure importance degree of the basic event ix is expressed by )(iIφ . By calculating the structure importance 
coefficient of each basic event, its structure importance degree can be sorted depending on the coefficient is big or 
small. 
Structure importance coefficient )(iIφ  of the basic event ix is:
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nüünumber of the basic event; 
im üücombination number when ix  changes from 0 to 1, in the 12 −n combinations drawn from ˄n-1˅
basic events.  
According to Equation (1), the structure importance coefficient of the basic event is calculated and sorted. The 
structure importance degrees of 40 basic events are sorted as follows.  
)2()32()31()40()39()38()37()36()35()34()33()30()1( φφφφφφφφφφφφφ IIIIIIIIIIIII >=>========>
)26()25()17()16()15()14()9()8()7()6()5()4()3( φφφφφφφφφφφφφ IIIIIIIIIIIII =>===========
)22()21()20()19()18()12()11()10()29()28()13()27( φφφφφφφφφφφφ IIIIIIIIIIII ====>==>=>>=
)24()23( φφ II ==
Structure importance degree sorting of the basic event provides the theoretical basis for preventive and control 
measures of the fire and explosion accident in combination station. 
3.2.  Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative analysis includes occurrence probability calculation of the top event, determination of probability 
importance degree and critical importance of the basic event.  
• Occurrence Probability Calculation of the Top Event 
With the utilization of minimal path sets, occurrence probability )(TP  of the top event is calculated, 
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in which, süü number of the minimal path sets; 
               iüü ordinal of the basic event; 
hj, üüordinal of the minimal path sets. 
By using the computing software, the calculated occurrence probability of the top event is 31073.6 −× .
• Probability Importance Calculation 
Probability importance of the basic event means the change rate ratio between occurrence probability of the top 
event and that of the basic event. If the occurrence probability of the top event is )(TP and that of the basic event ix
is iq , probability importance coefficient )(iI g of the basic event is: 
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• Critical Importance Calculation 
Critical importance is also called key importance. It represents the importance degree of basic event by using the 
relative change rate ratio between the occurrence probability of the basic event and that of the top event. Its 
definition formula is: 
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in which: )(iI c ——critical importance coefficient of the basic event i˗
               )(TP ——occurrence probability of the top event; 
iq ——occurrence probability of the basic event i˗
)(iI g ——probability importance coefficient of the basic event i .
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Therefore, the probability importance coefficient of the basic event, occurrence probability of the top event and 
basic event all contribute to critical importance calculation of each basic event. 
4. Prevention and Control Measures of Fire and Explosion Accident in Combination Station 
There are three burning elements: combustible substance, combustion-supporting substance and ignition source. 
Hence, during the prevention and control of the fire and explosion accident in the crude oil gathering-transport 
combination station, we must take measures starting from the three following aspects. 
• Controlling the combustible substance 
 Firstly, avoid and prevent the oil leakage because of the corrosion, overpressure rupture, artificial destruction 
and natural disasters, etc. Moreover, strengthen the concentration detection of the combustible gas. Also on-line 
monitor the important parameters like liquid level, temperature and pressure in the storage tank. In addition, choose 
the pipeline material meeting specific strength requirements together with safe pressure relief and vacuum 
prevention. 
• Isolating the combustion-supporting substance 
Isolating the combustion-supporting substance means isolating the air (oxygen) by employing the closed process, 
setting the waste oil recycling system and natural gas recycling system, etc. 
• Eliminating the ignition source 
Ignition sources in the combination station are the open fire, electrical apparatus spark, static electricity, lightning 
stroke, impact spark, friction spark, etc. Therefore, safety management should be enhanced to eliminate the ignition 
sources. 
• Perfect fire protection design and strengthen fire management 
Fire cooling device should be installed in the storage tank area to cool down the burning oil tank and nearby 
tanks. There must be some distances between facilities and buildings to fight against the fire. In strict accordance 
with the requirements of fire fighting, the fire vehicles, water and foam powder must be necessarily prepared and 
regularly checked as well as the fire alarm system and fire broadcasting system be set. Moreover, the fire dike and 
secure channel should be installed in the oil tank area. 
Above all, the design, daily check and maintenance of the combination station should be strict accordance with 
the requirements in "Standards of Fire Protection Design in Petrochemical Enterprises", etc. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper analyzes the fire and explosion risk in a crude oil gathering-transport combination station, establishing 
the fire and explosion fault tree as well as discussing it qualitatively and quantitatively. By using Boolean algebra, 
the qualitative analysis obtains 11 groups of minimal path sets and then structure importance degree of each basic 
event is sorted. As a result, the main reasons for the fire and explosion accidents are oil-gas explosive limit reach, 
bad ventilation, oil leakage caused by operational error, oil leakage caused by tank corrosion, tank oil-overs, and fire 
work in tank area, etc. Quantitative analysis mainly includes occurrence probability calculation of the top event and 
three importance analysis of each basic event. Based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis, it is proposed that 
prevention and control of the fire and explosion accident in the station should start from three burning elements. At 
the same time, design, maintenance and security check of the combination station should be strict accordance with 
the relevant standards and specifications requirements of fire and explosion protection in national petroleum and 
petrochemical enterprises. The research can provide theoretical direction for design, construction, management and 
maintenance of crude oil gathering-transport combination station. 
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